This special issue reflects the large number of high quality submissions on the economics of advertising that we have received in the last two years.
This paper presents a model of media competition with free entry when media platforms are financed both from advertising receipts and customers' subscriptions.
The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses participation externalities, but it has neglected pecuniary externalities between platforms.
This paper seeks to establish the importance of targeted advertising in media markets. Using zip-code level circulation for U.S.
Information technology lowers the cost of distributing information to dispersed consumers.
This paper is a first look at the dynamic effects of customer poaching in homogeneous product markets, where firms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness.
In a duopoly version of the Grossman and Shapiro [1984] model of informative advertising, I examine firms' incentives to semicollude on advertising and the welfare implications thereof.
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare.
There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products.
