The paper analyzes how takeovers, various takeover defences, and golden parachutes affect the value of target companies, using an incomplete contracts framework.
We resurrect an idea due to Hirshleifer [1971] by examining how one firm might profit by trading in the securities of other firms whose values are dependent upon the first firm's actions.
Studies of the largest contemporary fortunes in Great Britain, the United States, and Australia each find that over two-thirds of the fortunes originated in competitive industries.
This paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations, a price-matching policy, and their prices sequentially and independently, both tacit collusion and minimum differenti
The usual analysis of privatisation and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. We model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers.
Pre-emption often plays a crucial role in firms' merger decisions. We study whether and under which circumstances pre-emptive merging occurs in vertically related industries.
