Pierre Régibeau stepped down from the editorial board in June of this year.
The relationship between market structure, competition and economic outputs is central in industrial organization.
Exclusive dealing arrangements, in which a distributor agrees to work exclusively with a single manufacturer, can be efficiency enhancing or can be an anticompetitive means to foreclose markets.
We examine whether restricting a beer distributor's external trading opportunities increases the market shares of brands carried by the distributor.
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls.
We clarify the sense in which the market outcome may be biased against preference minorities, and estimate the degree of bias using an empirical model of entry into American radio broadcasting markets
Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate.
We study a model where an endogenous number of competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with exclusive retailers who are privately informed about their costs.
This paper studies the entry behavior of churches of different religious denominations.
