The paper analyzes some effects of price discrimination policy in a model where a dominant incumbent firm faces an endogenous degree of competition in one of its two markets.
Critics of capitalism contend that many products are designed to have uneconomically short lives, with the intention of forcing consumers to repurchase too frequently.
The focus of the paper is the effect of merger proposals on the expected profitability of the bidder and the target.
Negative externalities or "congestion" costs in the utilization of common resources introduce strategic considerations that tie cost allocation rules to competitiveness in external markets.
This paper models retail pharmacy distribution in terms of a quasi-monopolistically competitive market structure in which government remuneration determines industry numbers.
This article compares the strategic announcement of a reservation price by a bid-taking buyer in a first-price sealed bid auction with the strategy of no announcement.
The OLS estimator of the effect of concentration on price is biased for two reasons. First, performance feeds back into structure, causing a simultaneous equations bias.
