THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 0022-1821
Volume LVI June 2008 No. 2

Notes on the *Journal of Industrial Economics* Website

www.essex.ac.uk/jindec

THE MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE TELEVISON NEWS SCHEDULING GAME

Jean J. Gabszewicz†
Didier Laussel‡
Michel Le Breton§

We characterize the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of an extension of the 'television news scheduling game' of Cancian, Bergström and Bills [1995] where viewers want to watch the first newscast broadcast after they return home. A fraction of the viewers record randomly one of the newscasts to watch in case they are too late. At equilibrium, neither of the two stations broadcasts its evening news in the first part of the evening and the density function is strictly decreasing.

Posted 1 March, 2008-06-14

†Authors' affiliations: CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
e-mail: jean.gabszewicz@uclouvain.be
‡GREQAM, Université de la Méditerranée, Château La Farge, route de Milles, 13290 Les Milles, France.
e-mail: laussel@univ-aix.fr
§Industrial Economic Institute, Université de Toulouse 1, Manufacture des Tabacs, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France
e-mail: lebreton@cict.fr

© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.